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ABSTRACT 
The exponential demographic increase of the last century and the transformation 
of the cities, from industrial to service providers, added to the phenomenon of 
conurbation. In addition, the new social, environmental, economic, political and 
cultural dynamics of close cities, challenged the traditional municipal power 
and required a collaborative new management framework. Global cities became 
metropolitan areas. Issues of local urban interest are now of regional 
preoccupation. Governmental institutional frameworks and urban planning 
were not designed to match this new socioeconomic and environmental 
metropolitan order. This paper deals with the legal challenges of creating 
metropolitan governance structures comparing France and Brazil. This is a 
useful comparison in the sense that the demand for metropolitan governance 
structure is shared by different countries despite the differences in the way their 
systems of government are structured. France is a unitary State, and Brazil is 
structured into a federal system. This manuscript aims at demonstrating that not 
only communes, in the case of France, but also municipalities, in the case of 
Brazil, need regional solidarity strategies and federative cohesion to overcome 
common problems in large metropolitan areas such as transportation, sewage 
collection and treatment facilities, housing, sustainable drainage policies and 
even public safety policies. As case studies for the comparison proposed in this 
paper, we examine the metropolitan areas of Aix-Marseille-Provence, in France, 
with that of Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil.  
 
KEY WORDS:    Urban Planning, Metropolitan areas, Conurbation, Regional 
Urban Development  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2050, 89% of the Latin America population will be living in cities.1 
The shift from a rural to an urban society is also expected in Europe. Mainstream 
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urban issues, like transportation, sewage treatment and waste management will 
no longer be subject only to local authorities. Rather, they will have to adapt to 
the phenomenon of conurbation, defined as an urban area containing a large 
number of dwellers and “…formed by various towns growing and joining 
together.”2 For large urban areas all over the world, conurbation is already 
happening. Furthermore, functional metropolis can also derive from a group of 
several cities with the same dynamics – social, cultural, economical –, despite 
being already geographically “conurbated.” Dealing with the new governance 
structural demand arising thereof constitutes the big urban planning and 
management challenge facing law and policymakers around the globe towards 
the implementation of all urban dwellers’ right to the city.3  
The rapid rate of urban growth around the world is leading to 
conurbation and the appearance of what we can call “functional metropolis.” 
Those global cities, which, for Saskia Sassen,4 developed in the era of economic 
and political globalization, are becoming the heart of metropolitan areas. When 
cities get so close together due to a natural sprawling caused by urban growth 
or by economical, political and social conditions that turn them into functional 
metropolis, many of the issues subject to local authorities become of a 
metropolitan concern. A transportation policy choice of one municipality within 
a metropolitan area might have a negative impact on the neighboring city. The 
housing policy of a local power may be not enough to consider the ones that 
live far away from the city, in the suburb areas. And that is the case for other 
sensitive and equally important areas such as waste management, sewage 
collection and treatment facilities, sustainable drainage policies and even public 
safety policies including the hosting of jail buildings. In light of all those 
intertwined urban issues, a demand for a new form of governance arises 
naturally, regardless of how the government is structured in any given country. 
The case studies examined herein are examples of two distinct forms of 
government (Brazil, a federal republic, and France, characterized by a 
centralized federal authority) experiencing the conurbation and functional 
                                                          
York and a Master of Laws in Economic and Social Law and  LL.B. from Pontific Catholic 
University of Paraná Law School (PUC-PR). He is currently a professor of law at Getulio 
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1 UN-HABITAT. Estado de las Ciudades de America Latina y el Caribe 2012. 
http://www.onuhabitat.org Acesso em 7.11.2013.  
2 Cambridge Dictionary, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english-
portuguese/conurbation, last visited 23 January 2018.  
3 The acclaimed expression is form Henry Lefebvre, in his classic: LEFEBVRE, Henry. The 
right of the city.  On the other hand, the one who was more concerned about inequality in city 
is David Harvey in his oeuvres in general and, for this topic, more specifically in his book 
“Social Justice and the City”. 
4 SASSEN, Saskia. The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo: Princeton University Press, 
1991. 
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metropolisation phenomenon and the new governance framework demand 
arising thereof.  
Based on the experience drawn from a week-long immersion into the 
Aix-Marseille Provence metropolitan area, filled with lectures from renowned 
scholars and practitioners and instructive fieldtrips, all as part of the 2017 Study 
Space program of Georgia State University5, we gathered enough information 
to propose some preliminary grounds for a comparative analysis presented in 
this manuscript. Our objective is twofold: first, to shed light on the challenges 
of metropolitan governance arising from two different countries facing the 
conurbation phenomenon and the metropolitan issues; second, to evaluate 
possible legal and institutional tools to address those challenges. This paper 
takes the knowledge acquired during that week-long program in the Aix-
Marseille Provence metropolitan area and compares it with the Rio de Janeiro 
metropolitan area.  
The study of both metropolitan areas allowed us to identify governance 
challenges in promoting regional cooperation among local powers and 
interfederative regional power governance structures alien to those traditional 
systems of government. Possible legal and institutional solutions include: a 
legal system with mandatory collaborative provision imposed upon 
municipalities, a political and outreach strategy aimed at creating a voluntary 
spirit of collaboration among local powers, and an administrative structure of 
governance allowing for ample public participation. Some of those solutions 
have already been put into practice by both metropolitan regions examined in 
this manuscript.  
In order to identify the challenges and explore legal and institutional 
solutions to the metropolitan areas of Aix-Marseille Provence and Rio de 
Janeiro we begin with a brief overview of how the French and Brazilian 
governments are structured. Understanding the different forms of government 
will be illustrative to demonstrate that the governance challenges are common 
in metropolitan areas, irrespectively of the nation state organization power 
structure they are subsumed to. The second topic of our manuscript examines 
both countries’ constitutional provisions regarding urban law. The share of 
power a municipality holds within each constitutional system is instrumental in 
identifying metropolitan governance challenges and, consequently, the legal 
and institutional tools to overcome them. We then turn to the analysis of both 
countries’ federal laws regarding metropolitan areas. Both systems opted for 
federal laws laying the grounds for a regional and cooperative form of 
governance without undermining the foundations upon which both governments 
are structured. The creation of legally existent metropolitan areas in Brazil and 
France are dependent upon regional or local initiatives, a sort of bottom-up 
                                                          
5  Study Space X Marseille took place in the french city from 19 to 23 June of 2017, organized 
by Georgia State University College of Law’s Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan 
Growth and coordinated by Professor Julian Juergensmeyer and Karen Johnston. 
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democratic approach. In Brazil, the federal law – the Metropolitan Statute from 
2015 – deals only with metropolis. In France, metropolis is part of a General 
Code, created by two specific metropolitan rules: the MAPAM law, known as 
“modernization of the public action and affirmation of the metropolises”, 
promulgated in 2014, and the NOTRe law (new territorial organization of the 
Republic) published in 2015. Whether those laws constitute a sufficient legal 
instrument to promote a new regional metropolitan form of governance is the 
subject of the analysis conducted in this manuscript. Finally, before we render 
our concluding remarks, we intend to draw examples from the challenges, as 
well as from the legal and institutional tools we were able to identify in the Aix-
Marseille Provence metropolitan area and compare them to those of the 
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro.      
 
2. FORMS OF STATE IN BRAZIL AND IN FRANCE 
The political and administrative structures of France and Brazil are 
different.6 France is organized into a unitary, centralized state. Brazil is a 
peculiar federation with three autonomous entities sharing legislative and 
administrative powers: the federal government, states and municipalities.7 The 
federal district where the capital, Brasília, is located, is also an autonomous and 
independent entity of the federation.  
In practice, this apparent significant difference is relativized ever since 
a decentralized administrative movement began in France with the reform of the 
1958 Constitution in 2003. Conversely in Brazil, the federation concentrates 
much of the administrative power in the federal government, despite the 
constitutional provisions of shared powers. Furthermore, the largest share of 
Brazilian taxes is collected and held by the federal government, which generates 
a fiscal imbalance impairing states and municipalities, mainly, in their abilities 
to exercise their share of the constitutional administrative power in areas such 
as urban law.. This fiscal imbalance makes states and municipalities heavily 
                                                          
6 The comparison between both systems of government is presented in greater detail by 
CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. FARIAS, Talden. e AIETA, Vânia. Planejamento urbano e 
energias renováveis: diálogos franco-brasileiros. Belo Horizonte: Editar, 2016 – tradução livre. 
7 Although not provoking a quarrel like the historical one between federalists (HAMILTON, 
Alexander. MADISON, James. JAY, John. The Federalist Papers: A Collection of Essays 
Written in Favor of the New Constitution) and non-federalists, the inclusion of the 
Municipalities as a federative entity in the Brazilian constitution was a victory from the 
municipalism movement, guaranteeing political, administrative and, in these, financial 
autonomy to the local powers: the municipalities. It proved earlier than its promulgation: 
MEIRELLES, Hely Lopes. 3ª ed. ref. e atual. Direito Municipal Brasileiro. São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais, 1977.  
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dependent upon federal programs and from the transfer of resources from the 
federal government.   
On administrative urban management issues, however, municipalities in 
Brazil and communes in France, enjoy a great deal of autonomy in the planning 
and design of municipal policies. Such local autonomy is often a challenge for 
collaborative regional power management structures. Municipalities are 
reluctant to cede part of their autonomous power granted by their respective 
systems of government to an alien structure of governance involving diverse 
cities, often of different economic stature, social problems and, more 
importantly, governed by rival political parties.  
The differences in how the governments of Brazil and France are 
structured, the degree of local power, and the challenges arising thereof can be 
better contextualized in light of both countries´ constitutional frameworks. The 
following two sections examine the Brazilian and the French constitutions 
regarding their systems of government. The focus is on highlighting the degree 
of local power and the challenges for a new form of collaborative regional 
power structure to deal with the issues of common metropolitan interest.   
  
2.1. Brazilian Constitutional Framework 
Brazil is organized into a peculiar form of federation, with three degrees 
of powers: federal, represented by the Union; regional, by the State-Members; 
and local, through municipalities. The 1988 Federal Constitution (“BC/88”) 
enumerates issues of exclusive federal legislative authority and issues of shared 
ones. The BC/88 conferred municipalities with an autonomous and independent 
status within the federation, equivalent to federal and state governments, and 
empowered them to enact laws and manage issues of local interest, mainly with 
respect to urban planning. 
The large list of enumerated shared powers to state and municipal 
governments, including in the areas of environmental and urban policy, 
indicates a great degree of autonomy. However, due to an intense federal 
legislative appetite over all those issues of shared power, in practice, state and 
municipal legislative powers end up being limited in scope. This is due to a 
supremacy clause providing that federal law preempts state and municipal laws 
over issues of shared legislative power. Therefore, state and municipal laws 
often mirror those enacted by the federal congress or are laws detailing further 
issues legislated already by the federal government. However, municipal 
legislative power over issues of local interest such as those relating to land use 
planning and the social function of the city provide municipalities with a great 
degree of rulemaking autonomy.  
Federal law dealing with cities is limited to setting forth general 
provisions and tools municipalities can choose to include in their legislation, 
zoning and planning regulation. The BC/88 dedicated a whole chapter (articles 
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182 and 183) to deal with aspirational provisions such as the social function of 
the city and urban property. Congress then enacted two relevant urban statutes 
to further detail the constitutional aspirational provisions: the Statute of the City 
(Law 10,257/2001) and the Statute of Metropolitan Areas (Law 13,089/2015). 
Even though the federal government has occupied the field, preemption 
randomly occurs in urban law because those federal constitutional and 
legislative provisions work more as a charter of fundamental urban principles 
and as a menu of different legal urban management tools for local lawmakers. 
Though significant room for local legislative power remains.8 A great deal of 
political will remain within municipal authorities to preserve legislative and 
management powers over issues of local interest.  
The limiting factor of municipal power in Brazil is the uneven 
distribution of wealth and of tax revenues. Most of the 5,570 municipalities in 
Brazil are not independently economically viable, but instead rely upon the 
distribution of federal and state tax revenues. In large municipalities with large 
tax incomes, the municipal budget is often not sufficient to address the 
challenges of related to deep social inequalities in large metropolitan areas. 
Therefore, in practice, a high degree of dependence on federal and state funds 
limits municipalities´ management powers arising from their legislative 
constitutional authority. In this sense, grouping municipalities into a 
collaborative metropolitan governance structure has the potential to strengthen 
municipal leverage towards a larger financial independence that, in turn, will 
enhance their legislative and self-management autonomy.  
 
2.2. FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
Contrary to Brazil, a country organized into a federation, France is a 
unitary state, an inheritance from absolutist times. More recently though, with 
the 2003 reform of the 1958 Constitution, a new interpretation emerged. A 
principle of administrative decentralization arose and resulted in an increase of 
administrative and financial powers to the land collectivities that compose the 
State. The unitary system of the French state had to accommodate a 
constitutional principle reflecting a social demand for a decentralized 
management structure. 
France´s political administrative structure is composed of three levels of 
elected local governmental authorities according to the General Code of Land 
                                                          
8 Some important urban legal instruments are mandatory, like a master plan for any city with 
more than twenty thousand inhabitants. Others, however, such as participatory budgeting, fall 
within the discretionary power of local authorities.  
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Collectivities: 9 10  regions, departments and communes. None of those more 
than 35,000 entities within the country, however, have rulemaking power, at 
least not to prevail over federal regulation. Chrétien and Chifflot explain that 
« au sein des institutions françaises, la décentralisation correspond à 
l´attribution d´une certaine autonomie à des collectivités qui ´s´administrent 
librement par des conseils élus´, sous le contrôle du gouvernement. »11  
A commune is the equivalent of a municipality, representing the closest 
local authority to the people of all those decentralized authorities. The country 
has a long history of cooperation among communes with shared interests.12 
Through an intercommunality structure that dates to the 19th Century, a 
communality (group of communes) can collaborate in areas such as public 
transportation, water supply and others alike. One kind of interfederative 
collectivity is the metropolis, constituting the most integrated form of 
intercommunality structure in France and providing for a regional authority to 
deal with the common interests of a metropolitan area. 
In urban law, for instance, the French Constitution set forth the 
fundamental principle of local power over local territorial planning and 
management. However, contrary to the Brazilian Constitution, the French 
Magna Carta does not deal with urban law expressly. Constitutional urban 
provisions in the French system are implicit, as ruled by the French State 
Council, being part of the constitutional environmental protection provisions13 
and other principles such as legitimate restrictions to the private property right. 
When combined with the land collectivities self-management power, those 
constitutional provisions provide for the legal framework on urban law. In that 
sense, the notion of regional governance through the establishment of a 
metropolis serves to strengthen communes by promoting economy of scale and 
enhancing political power whenever feasible.  
Against both countries´ constitutional background on urban law, the 
following chapter examines the details of how local authority is exercised 
through the legal framework in place. Brazil and France have enacted 
metropolitan statutory provisions to accommodate an alien form of regional 
                                                          
9 Access to the General Code of Land Collectivities: 
< https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070633>  
10 The most important bibliographic reference about land collectivities in France is: AUBY, 
Jean-Bernard et alli. Droit des collectivités locales. 5a. ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1990. 
11 Into French institutions, the decentralization means a kind of autonomy to collectivities so 
that they can administrate themselves with freedom by elected organisms, under the 
governmental control.  (CHRÉTIEN, Patrice. et CHIFFLOT, Nicolas. Droit administratif. 13a 
ed. Paris : Dalloz, 2012 – free translation). 
12 CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. FARIAS, Talden. e AIETA, Vânia. Planejamento urbano e 
energias renováveis: diálogos franco-brasileiros. Belo Horizonte: Editar, 2016 – tradução livre. 
13 The protection of Environmental Law happend by the promulgation of the “Bill of the 
Environment”, from 2004, included in the french block of constitutionality.  
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collaborative structure in their respective systems of government. The promises 
of such an institutional arrangement are matched by the challenges of bringing 
local authorities to the table and convincing them to cede part of their municipal 
power on behalf of the regional common good.  
 
3. FRENCH AND BRAZILIAN LAWS ON METROPOLITAN AREAS 
A legal framework to deal with metropolitan areas arose from a demand 
for coordinated local polices due to the massive conurbation phenomenon 
experienced by major cities around the world and by common economic, 
political and social dynamics of metropolitan areas around those large 
municipalities. Irrespectively of the political-administrative structure of any 
given country, whether a unitary centralized state – like France, or a federalist 
state such as Brazil –, the urban sprawl of recent decades created a need for 
coordinated policies to provide city dwellers with access to services like water 
supply and sewage, transportation, affordable housing, waste management and 
others. That, in turn, imposed upon lawmakers the task of providing 
metropolitan areas with a formal management structure with self-organization 
and executive powers over those issues of common regional interest. Within 
this collaborative management power structure, allowing for effective public 
participation and balancing the distribution of deliberative power among 
participating municipalities became a crucial part to achieving the metropolitan 
goals of coordinating policies over issues of common regional interest. Both 
countries accommodated the metropolitan demands into their respective legal 
orders: in France, in the General Code of Land Collectivities; in Brazil, in the 
Metropolitan Area Act of 2015. The following sections examine in greater detail 
those metropolitan statutory frameworks.  
 
3.1. THE FRENCH METROPOLIS AS AN INTERFEDERATIVE MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
Throughout the 20th Century, France experienced a growing demand 
from decentralized authorities for a greater degree of administrative autonomy. 
The central government responded by augmenting local authorities´ taxation 
and legal powers. In January 2015, a French decree legally instituted into 
metropolis all existing informal interfederative collaborative structures, 
empowering them with self-taxation autonomy. All management powers 
previously acquired by those more informal collaborative interfederative 
structures were transferred to the then recently instituted metropolises by the 
decree.  
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According to the General Code of Land Collectivities14, there are three 
forms of governmental authorities: regions, departments and communes. 
Considering France has over 35,000 communes, the governmental system had 
to accommodate intercommunal collaboration to deal with issues of regional 
common interest. Within this collaborative management structure emerged the 
notion of a metropolis upon which the legal framework was built. According to 
Article L-5217-1 in Chapter VII (Metropolis) of Book 2 (Cooperation 
Interfederative) of the Fifth Section (Local Cooperation) of the General Code 
of Land Collectivities,15 a “metropolis” is defined as: 
“…[a] public institution of inter-municipal co-operation 
with self-taxation power which unites several communes 
into one structure and without enclave within a space of 
solidarity to elaborate and to lead together a project of 
economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social 
planning and development of their territory in order to 
improve their cohesion and competitiveness and to 
contribute to sustainable and inclusive development of the 
regional territory.”16 
The creation and implementation of a metropolis is legally done by a 
decree. The creating decree sets forth the name of the metropolis, its perimeter, 
headquarters, enumerated powers as well as its starting operating date. A 
metropolis is not bound by a specific term. Whenever a metropolis is instituted, 
no time limitation applies.  
Article L5217-2 of the General Code of Land Collectivities lists areas 
of metropolitan authority. Zoning, actions towards the economic development 
of the metropolis and management power over issues of metropolitan common 
interest fall within the metropolis´ authority. The urban planning of a 
metropolitan area is conducted “en lieu et place des communes membres” or, in 
substitution of its commune’s members. 
The French metropolitan legal framework empowered the metropolis 
significantly. It also recognized an informal collaborative action practiced by 
communes before a formal legal framework was in place. This legal recognition 
                                                          
14 Acess to the General Code of Land Colectivities: 
< https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070633>, in 23 
February 2018.  
15 The Law MAPAM is considered the one of the modernisation of public action and 
metropolitan affirmative act and was published in 27 January 2014. The Law n° 2015-991, from 
August 7, 2015 brought a new land organization of the French Republic. 
16 La métropole est un établissement public de coopération intercommunale à fiscalité propre 
regroupant plusieurs communes d'un seul tenant et sans enclave au sein d'un espace de 
solidarité pour élaborer et conduire ensemble un projet d'aménagement et de développement 
économique, écologique, éducatif, culturel et social de leur territoire afin d'en améliorer la 
cohésion et la compétitivité et de concourir à un développement durable et solidaire du 
territoire régional. (free translation in english in the text) 
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of a metropolis responded to the aforementioned historical demand without 
changing the French system of government. The decentralized metropolis did 
not constitute another layer of power-structure entity within the French unitary 
state. Rather, it absorbed most of the local authorities’ powers over issues of 
common regional interest. In practice, the legal recognition of a metropolitan 
authority represented a subrogation of local entities´ authority in favor of 
regional common interests.  In that sense, the French metropolitan structures 
end up being more robust than their Brazilian counterparts still limited by the 
broad constitutional legislative and executive powers enjoyed by municipalities.  
 
3.2. THE BRAZILIAN METROPOLITAN LAW  
The conception of metropolitan areas was allowed by the 1967 Brazilian 
Constitution under the Chapter of “Social and Economic Order.” Under that 
former constitutional order, the federal government was empowered to create 
metropolitan areas by means of “complementary” law, one which requires 
qualified majority in Congress. The current 1988 Constitution maintained a 
similar provision, but empowered states – through their respective legislative 
powers – to enact, also through qualified majority, laws creating metropolitan 
areas. Article 25, paragraph 3, of the Brazilian Constitution allows for states to 
create by state complementary law subject to a qualified majority, metropolitan 
areas formed by neighboring cities. The identifiable need for integrated 
management, planning and execution of common interest policies shall give rise 
to the creation of a metropolitan area. 
Another significant difference between the 1967 and the current 1988 
Brazilian Constitution was that the metropolitan area provision was relocated in 
the former Carta Magna to the Chapter dealing with the Organization of the 
State. That, however, was not sufficient to confer upon metropolitan areas the 
political status enjoyed by the federal, state, municipal and the federal district 
governments. Metropolitan organizations were entitled to administrative 
powers enumerated by state law and subject to municipal political autonomy. In 
that way, metropolitan areas constitute a regional intergovernmental structure 
of administrative power over areas of common interest. The 1988 Constitution 
enabled states to institute and organize the administrative structure of a 
metropolitan area.  
The rationale behind the conception of metropolitan administrative 
structures in Brazil lies in the recognition that some issues are not exclusively 
of local interest whenever conurbation occurs. Issues like environmental 
protection of local resources, water supply and sewage treatment, drainage, 
transportation and waste management in metropolitan areas can be of regional 
interest without, however, being of state interest to attract state legislative and 
management power. Instead, whenever conurbation and functional metropolis 
gives rise to shared interests, municipalities and the state will have joint 
responsibilities demanding thereof an interfederative governance structure. That 
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means a metropolitan management structure allowing for executive and 
rulemaking powers to the municipalities and the state, instituted and organized 
by the latter, but with enumerated powers exercised in conjunction with the 
former.  
The Brazilian Constitution did not empower metropolitan areas as an 
independent and autonomous political entity within the federation. They rely, 
therefore, on the cooperation among the executive powers of the municipalities 
involved in the limits of the law of the state. Because those municipalities and 
the state are autonomous political entities of the federation, there lies the 
challenge of establishing an executive and legislative condominium over those 
issues of common interest. In part, also because a metropolitan region created 
by state law does not constitute an association of municipalities, but an organism 
that takes care of common interests. A metropolis, therefore, does not substitute 
local authority: the new and common interests must be taken into account 
without undermining a municipality’s autonomy. The cities of a metropolitan 
area cannot withdraw from this administrative management structure. In light 
of their political autonomy, municipalities can vote as they please on those 
issues of metropolitan interests and withhold the remaining powers over issues 
of strictly local interest. But they will still be bound by the interventions arising 
from the decisions made by the metropolitan authority on behalf of the regional 
common interest. This special feature differentiates metropolitan governance 
structures in Brazil from those in France. In the latter, the metropolis authority 
claims the powers of the communes. In Brazil, the metropolitan authority 
exercises a combination of powers conferred upon it by the state and 
participating municipalities. Those powers must be duly justifiable in the 
instituting statute as those needed for the management of issues of regional 
common interest.17 
In Brazil, a state must initiate the process of instituting a metropolitan 
authority whenever the need for more coordinated management in large urban 
areas composed of two or more cities is identified. In that sense, the Brazilian 
metropolitan authorities does not resemble those entities created by 
international agreements setting regional governance structures among nation-
states. Those authorities are instituted based on a voluntary sovereign will of 
participating countries as opposed to the metropolitan regions in Brazil, which 
result from the will of the state legislative power. That does not mean, however, 
that states enjoy unlimited discretionary power to create metropolitan areas. 
They must identify the demand for an interfederative governance structure 
arising from the need of coordinated policies in issues of common interest. An 
arbitrary state law creating a metropolitan area, one that does not account for an 
                                                          
17 This is the rationale of the Brazilian Supreme Court ruling in the paradigm case Adin n. 
1842/RJ – STF, available at 
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarJurisprudencia.asp?s1=%28ADI%24%2ESCLA%2
E+E+1842%2ENUME%2E%29+OU+%28ADI%2EACMS%2E+ADJ2+1842%2EACMS%2
E%29&base=baseAcordaos&url=http://tinyurl.com/cbldmcg  (last visited on 10 March 2018). 
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integrated and coordinated management demand in light of issues of common 
interest, is likely to be unconstitutional.   
The Brazilian Metropolitan Act, Law 13,089 enacted on 12 January 
2015, regulates a longstanding constitutional provision recognizing this new 
form of intergovernmental (or interfederative) governance demand and creating 
the standards that authorize the creation, by the state law, of metropolitan areas, 
its common interests, the parameters of the governance system and deliberating 
structure. Being part of a metropolitan region does not limit municipal political-
administrative and legislative autonomy under the Brazilian Constitution. That 
would also be unconstitutional. Rather, a metropolitan authority constitutes a 
legal response to the conurbation phenomenon and to the functional 
metropolitan standards, conditioning municipal authority to take into 
consideration the regional common interest in areas of such nature. That is 
exactly what the Metropolitan Law of 2015 addressed. The statute imposed the 
requirement that local planning and management be consistent with regional 
planning and management in areas of local interest identified by the 
metropolitan authority.  
The 2015 Metropolitan Law set forth the definition of a metropolis, a 
metropolitan area, public service in areas of common interest and, most 
importantly, interfederative governance. By the latter, the law defines the 
sharing of responsibilities and actions among independent entities of the 
federation regarding the organization, planning and execution of public services 
in areas of common interest. The fundamental pillars for the interfederative 
governance are those listed by article 6 of the law: prevailing of common over 
local interests; shared responsibilities towards the promotion of integrated urban 
development; political autonomy of the entities of the federation; due attention 
for regional and local peculiarities; democratic management of the city; 
effective use of public resources; and sustainable development.  
Worth noticing that the interfederative governance structure created by 
the 2015 Metropolitan Law aimed at highlighting the demand for a regional 
management organization to deal with issues of common interest without 
undermining the political autonomy of municipalities and states as set forth the 
in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. To accommodate the country´s federalist 
system of government with this new interfederative governance structure, the 
2015 Metropolitan Law granted participating municipalities into a metropolitan 
region the right to participate fully into the executive decision and rulemaking 
process, as well as the obligation to share the financial burdens arising thereof 
according to their respective shares as agreed upon in the articles of 
incorporation. To that extent, article 8 of the 2015 Metropolitan Law instituted 
an executive entity, a deliberative council and a technical and advisory body. 
The executive entity shall be composed of representatives of the participating 
entities of the federation (cities and state) to reflect and accommodate the 
municipal political autonomy under the federalist system.  
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One of the main features of the aforementioned 2015 Act is the 
requirement imposed upon the Metropolitan Region to have an integrated urban 
development plan, taking into consideration the local peculiarities of all 
involved cities. Furthermore, the 2015 Act imposes upon participating 
municipalities the need to review their respective master plans to make them 
compatible with the integrated urban development plan. This is a major 
provision as it weighs in favor of the regional common interest principle in 
comparison with the constitutional local autonomy premise. In that regard, the 
2015 Act came to reflect the ruling in a 1998 paradigm Supreme Court case 
upholding that the Metropolitan Authority is an executive-administrative entity 
combining all metropolitan interests, according to rules of proceedings that can 
be freely agreed upon so long as one federalist entity´s will does not prevail 
over the others. With respect specifically to the common interest principle, this 
landmark precedent upheld the municipal autonomy, but ruled that such 
important constitutional provision is not sufficient to allow a municipality to 
refuse or withdraw from the metropolitan authority once instituted by state law.    
The interfederative governance concept formally instated by the 2015 
Metropolitan Law was able to legally accommodate a different institutional 
framework demanded by the conurbation phenomenon and the new land 
demands of common interests. Without undermining the federalist premise of 
the Brazilian system of government, the interfederative governance concept 
allowed for municipalities to participate fully in the executive and 
administrative rulemaking process together with the state on matters of common 
interest of a metropolitan area without undermining their autonomy over those 
issues of local affairs strictly considered. In that sense, the 2015 Metropolitan 
Law clears the pathway for metropolitan authorities to implement coordinated 
and integrated common interest policies by providing the necessary legal 
predictability and stability to address the shared urban, environmental and 
socioeconomic demands arising from the conurbation phenomenon.  
   
4. THE AIX-MARSEILLE-PROVENCE METROPOLIS AND THE 
METROPOLITAN REGION OF RIO DE JANEIRO 
Against the brief historical and legal panorama presented hitherto, in 
following sections we examine the Aix-Marseille-Provence Metropolis and the 
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro in a comparative perspective. We aim to 
use both regions as case studies to support our analysis of France and Brazil, 
indicating the need for an interfederative form of governance structure to face 
the growing demand for integrated regional policymaking processes.  
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4.1. THE AIX-MARSEILLE-PROVENCE METROPOLIS 
The metropolis of Aix-Marseille Provence, the largest one in France, 
concentrates 92 communes and 1.8 million inhabitants, 93% of the population 
of Bouches-du-Rhône and 37% of the population of the ensemble of the 
Provence-Alpes- Côte d'Azur. It is managed by a metropolitan council of 240 
members appointed by the participating communes. It exercises authority over 
issues of economic development, land planning and the administration of some 
public services. In terms of territorial governance, the metropolis of Aix-
Marseille-Provence is subdivided into six territories – relating back to the old 
interfederative entities - each one of them with its own council. There is also 
the Council of the Metropolis, with elected President and Vice-President. Aix-
Marseille-Provence benefits from an adapted internal architecture and specific 
implementation methods. While the ten French metropolises, created on 
January 1, 2015, were the result of the transformation of an urban community 
or agglomeration community, without a change in scope, the Aix-Marseille-
Provence Metropolis is born from the merger of 6 EPCI (establishment publique 
inter-communal) of its territory. Its date of creation was therefore postponed to 
January 1, 2016 and a transitional period between 2016 and 2020 was 
introduced to accommodate the administrative complexity of this merger. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Aix-Marseille Provence Metropolis 
 
   Source: http://www.marseille-provence.fr 
 
The Aix-Marseille-Provence is legally supported by the General Code 
of Land Collectivities and, specially, two laws: (i) The MAPAM law, known as 
“modernization of the public action and affirmation of the metropolises,” 
promulgated on January 27, 2014, and (ii) the NOTRe law (new territorial 
organization of the republic) published on August 8, 2015 in the Official 
Journal. This law introduces important shifts to the provisions relating to the 
organization and functioning of the metropolis initially envisaged by the 
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MAPAM law. According to its official electronic page,18 the law defines certain 
powers as falling exclusively within the metropolis´ authority: major master 
plans in economic development and organization of economic spaces and 
metropolitan operations, territorial coherence, transport and mobility, roads, 
housing, urban development, sanitation and rainwater, market of national 
interest, waste management, the environment, energy, climate, support 
programs and support for higher education institutions and research programs, 
concession of the public distribution of electricity and gas, urban heating or 
cooling networks and the development of the metropolitan project. 
According to research conducted by the Brazilian Metropolitan 
Observatory,19 “the experience of the Marseille-Aix metropolitan area shows 
the limits and potentialities of negotiation among local actors in the relatively 
centralized French system.” The negotiation challenges are presented by this 
research as one of the main institutional challenges to overcome. It should be 
noted that this is a territory with a low degree of social capital and with large 
intra-metropolitan disparities and that was strongly affected by the process of 
productive restructuring. Since the mid-1960s, the restructuring of the 
petrochemical, naval and mining industries has strongly affected the city of 
Marseille, which has gone into decay. At the same time, in the mildest of the 
process of decentralization, which began in the 1980s, French cities and regions 
gained a greater degree of autonomy in structuring their policies, but without 
mechanisms to ensure a proper degree of cooperation on the metropolitan scale. 
Greater collaboration was only perceived in the beginning of the 21st century, 
after an affirmative action20 in direction of bigger powers to metropolitan 
structures, with the enactment of the NOTRe law (new territorial organization 
of the republic). 
According to Mr. Vincent Fouchier, general director adjunct of Aix-
Marseille-Provence Metropolis, who delivered the first lecture in the Study 
Space 2017 in Marseille, the fundamental pillar to strengthening the 
institutionalization of the Aix-Marseille-Provence metropolis were: (i) 
cooperation and (ii) innovation. Cooperation to overcome the inequality of its 
communes and the local disputes and to solve common metropolitan issues, as 
transportation, housing and quarrels against suburbs and innovation, by new 
concepts, as smart cities, living labs, smart transportation and technology 
incubators. The work conducted in Aix-Marseille-Provence was to create 
institutional tools of partnership and a sense of collectiveness never experienced 
                                                          
18 Available at http://www.marseille-provence.fr/index.php/la-metropole/la-metropole-aix-
marseille-provence, with access in 10 December 2017. 
19 OBSERVATÓRIO DAS METRÓPOLES. Novas governanças para as áreas 
metropolitanas o panorama internacional e as perspectivas para o caso brasileiro. Disposal 
in: http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.ufrj.br/relatorio_Klink.pdf, with access in 23 
February 2018. 
20 The Law MAPAM is considered the one of the modernisation of public action and 
metropolitan affirmative act and was published in 27 January 2014. 
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before. There were four pillars over which the cooperative work had to stand: 
(i) democracy, once the metropolis are considered to be too far away from the 
citizens; (ii) innovation, by technology incubators to create the cities of the 
future; (iii) partnership, to share good practices and become known in the 
international scene and (iv) internationalization, to become a global metropolis. 
 The research developed by the Brazilian Metropolitan Observatory21 
verified that, after working with the communes together, there was a gradual 
strengthening of the community (intermunicipal consortium), mainly due to two 
factors. First, there was a greater awareness among the mayors that the decision 
to delegate certain services of common interest should take place on a 
consensual basis, that is, from the individual analysis of each city/comune about 
the relationship cost/benefit rationality of regionalization.22 A growing number 
of cities have urban community due to the impossibility of paying, individually, 
the costs of operation and maintenance of services such as public transport and 
waste management. Increasing economy of scale is a great asset a regional 
development metropolis can offer. A second factor that strengthened the 
consortium movement was the selective financial incentives set up by the 
central government to stimulate urban communities.23 This system played an 
important role in reducing disputes among participating cities. 
The Aix-Marseille-Provence is demonstrating that the legal framework 
alone for this innovative structure of government is not sufficient to promote 
cooperation on behalf of the common regional good. The institutionalization of 
a metropolitan authority with concrete actions to demonstrate to local 
authorities and city dwellers the value of collaborative management structures 
is akin to achieving the regional urban development goals.  Based on the 
experience drawn from the Aix-Marseille-Provence metropolitan case study, 
the following section will examine the case of the metropolitan region of Rio de 
Janeiro.    
                                                          
21 Available at: http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.ufrj.br/relatorio_Klink.pdf, with access 
in 23 February 2018.   
22 For a discussion about law and economics, it must be rid of the controversials thoughts of 
Posner: POSNER, Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law.  Boston: Little Brown, 1973. 
Applyng to the relation cost-benefit in decision of Public Administration, the pragmatism of 
Posner is used not by judges, but administrators.  
23 The opposite happened in Brazil, where the fund created by the Metropolitan Statute was 
rejected by the President, what tends to make failure the initiatives in large scale, that demands 
a strong budget. The veto over the creation of a national metropolitan fund came to be criticized 
as a decisive factor for the possible failure of the FPICs which, given the breadth of the territory 
covered, presupposes the need for substantial financial resources. According to Santos and 
Vasques, "by rejecting Section II of the Metropolitan Statute, where the National Integrated 
Urban Development Fund (FNDUI) was foreseen, the sources of funding for these services did 
not receive adequate treatment, unchanged the picture of strong heterogeneity among the 
Brazilian municipalities”. (SANTOS, Ângela Moulin Penalva. e VASQUES, Pedro. Estatuto 
da Metrópole: avanço normativo na gestão territorial a espera de cooperação financeira. In: 
AIETA, Vânia. (Org.) Direito da Cidade. Tomo I. Coleção UERJ 80 Anos. Rio de Janeiro: 
Freitas Bastos, 2015)  
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 4.2. THE METROPOLITAN REGION OF RIO DE JANEIRO (“RMRJ”) 
The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro was legally instituted in 
1975.24 It is currently formed by municipalities located along and in the 
surroundings of the Guanabara Bay. The participating cities are: Belford Roxo, 
Duque de Caxias, Nilópolis, Guapimirim, Itaboraí, Niterói, Magé, Maricá, Nova 
Iguaçu, Paracambi, Queimados, São Gonçalo, São João do Meriti, Seropédica, 
Mesquita, Tanguá, Itaguaí and Japeri. This grouping of neighboring cities 
exposes a great deal of intrametropolitan inequality. The city of Rio de Janeiro, 
despite also being a very unequal city, presents much higher socioeconomic 
indicators than the other participating cities. Japeri, for instance, ranks at the 
bottom of the Brazilian equivalent of the Human Development Index (“HDI”), 
comparable to those cities of least developed countries in Africa. Considering 
that the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro exists since 1975, such great 
socioeconomic inequality is strong evidence of the failure of this regional 
governance struture in promoting integrated policies towards increasing the 
quality of life of its inhabitants.25  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 During this time, the RMRJ has been (re)created by successive laws, generally maintaining 
the same federative entities. The most revolutionary one – written after the decision of the 
Supreme Court about one of them and the Metropolitan Statute – is still just a project in the 
Legislative Power. That´s the Complementary Law Project n. 10/2015, presented in face of the 
Legislative Concil of the State of Rio de Janeiro. 
25 “The cause of this intrametropolitan inequality seems to be the absence of what has been 
called the centralized and exclusive metropolitan governance structure, capable of articulating 
the interests and sharing the metropolitan issues of all the Federative Entities that integrate the 
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ), for which, for historical reasons, the capital, 
the city of Rio de Janeiro, ended up ´isolated´" CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. Governança 
Metropolitana: desafio para a gestão pública fluminense. XXIII Encontro Nacional do 
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito 2014. Florianópolis: 
CONPEDI, 2014, with disposal in: 
<http://publicadireito.com.br/publicacao/ufsc/livro.php?gt=194> and access in 10 january 
2015. 
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Figure 2:  Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro 
 
Source: http://www.mapa-brasil.com  
 The extinction of the Foundation for Regional Development of Rio de 
Janeiro (“FUNDREM”) in 1989, a centralized metropolitan entity in charge of 
the planning and execution of regional public policies, left the RMRJ 
institutional arrangements pulverized, segmented and "thematic." The RMRJ 
became powerless, incapable (in theory) to coordinate the implementation of 
public policies of common interest.  In this sense, the aforementioned decision 
of the Brazilian Supreme Court, according to which the state and municipalities 
within a metropolitan region have shared decision-making power, renewed the 
hopes of a more effective governance structure. This decision allowed for an 
inclusive and balanced decision-making process, guaranteeing a voice for 
municipalities and the state without undermining the constitutional legislative 
and executive state and municipal federalist authorities.  
For many years the state of Rio de Janeiro enjoyed qualified decision 
power over water treatment services or whenever a municipality claimed 
constitutional authority to exercise such power, it could do so. Even with the 
creation of a metropolitan authority, there was no space for integrated and 
coordinated decision-making processes. In practice, the constitutional 
provisions on shared legislative and executive powers undermined the 
metropolitan legal framework calling for regional integration on matters of 
common interest. The aforementioned Supreme Court case shifted this scenario. 
The Court ruled unconstitutional the Rio de Janeiro state law (re)recreating the 
RMRJ in the part that conferred upon the state qualified decision-making power 
over water treatment facilities. The ruling considered that the state law invaded 
the city of Rio de Janeiro’s federative autonomy. Furthermore, the opinion 
highlighted that municipalities were not entitled to claim their constitutional 
autonomy to decide alone without due care to the stakes of other metropolitan 
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cities and the state itself on those issues of common interest like water treatment 
services, the subject of the lawsuit before the Supreme Court.26  
 After the Supreme Court decision on the matter, Congress enacted the 
Metropolitan Region Act (Law 13,089/2015). This statute instituted governance 
standards and criteria for the sharing of decision-making power among 
municipalities and the state. It also created the institutional framework and 
imposed obligations upon participating municipalities and the state to 
collaborate on matters of common interest. The statute called for ample public 
participation in the deliberation process and imposed the obligation for an 
integrated Regional Urban Plan. This is a powerful legal tool as it has the 
potential to impose a collaborative attitude upon the local policymaker.   
 Currently, the State of Rio de Janeiro’s legislature is examined a 
restructuring bill that would adapt the RMRJ to the provisions set forth in the 
federal framework law. However, a major source of controversy in this bill lies 
on the heavy weight of the state and city of Rio de Janeiro in the decision-
making process. By insisting on an unbalanced system of consideration over 
matters of regional common interest, the bill is prone to failure once again. It is 
crucial that local policymakers and the legislature understand the need to set 
aside the limitations imposed by the pseudo constitutional autonomy in matters 
of regional common interest to fight the great socioeconomic inequalities the 
RMRJ is struggling to solve since it was first instituted in 1975.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
With the demographic explosion of the last century and the conurbation 
phenomenon experience by major cities, a demand for a new form of 
governance structure arose. A governance structure that takes into account 
matters traditionally considered issues of strictly local interest, such as 
transportation, waste management, water supply and treatment and affordable 
housing became concerns of common regional interest. The demand for this 
new form of interfederative governance system became part of national 
agendas, irrespective of how each nation’s system of government is structured. 
The cases of France and Brazil highlighted in this comparative manuscript are 
illustrative of such a phenomenon.  
The 2013 French Metropolis law reflected an ongoing practice initiated 
by the need for more coordinated regional policy strategies with the 
constitutional decentralization movement of the 20th Century. Informal 
collaborative initiatives within the territorial collectivities uniting different 
communes became formally integrated into Metropolis with the new legal 
paradigm. The French Metropolis of Aix-an-Marseille-Provence constitutes a 
                                                          
26 Adin n. 1842/RJ - STF 
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rich case study of how the new legal framework allowed for the region to 
overcome great challenges relating to inequalities and economic depression.  
Conversely, Brazil has a legal framework allowing for more formal 
structures of metropolitan regions dating back to the constitutional regime of 
1967. However, due to the challenges of a constitutional framework allowing 
for a great degree of legislative and executive autonomy to states and 
municipalities, together with a high degree of socioeconomic inequality among 
cities facing conurbation, tackling those obstacles has been politically difficult. 
A Supreme Court ruling setting the grounds for a balanced collaborative 
decision-making metropolitan governance structure along with the 2015 new 
Metropolitan Region Act constitute promising legal changes in overcoming the 
historical barriers before a successful regional integration model.   
What the lessons from the weeklong immersion in the Aix-an-Marseille-
Provence Metropolis demonstrated, especially in comparison with the 
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro, is that the local entities’ approach to 
urban issues is no longer effective. A new urban management framework is 
necessary irrespective of how each nation’s system of government is structured. 
It arises from the demands created by the conurbation phenomenon, attracting 
more than half of the world’s population to major cities and their suburban 
municipalities. Issues that, in the recent past, have been considered strictly of 
local interest have now become challenges of common regional concern. 
Recognizing this demographic phenomenon and, consequently, new urban 
territorial shift is crucial for an effective law and regulatory policy design that 
creates the proper incentives for collaborative and integrated actions within 
metropolitan areas.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 2 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/4
 REFERENCES: 
AUBY, Jean-Bernard et alli. Droit des collectivités locales. 5a. ed. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. 
CHRÉTIEN, Patrice. et CHIFFLOT, Nicolas. Droit administratif. 13a ed. 
Paris : Dalloz, 2012 
CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. FARIAS, Talden. e AIETA, Vânia. 
Planejamento urbano e energias renováveis: diálogos franco-brasileiros. 
Belo Horizonte: Editar, 2016. 
CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. Governança Metropolitana: desafio para a 
gestão pública fluminense. XXIII Encontro Nacional do Conselho Nacional 
de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito 2014. Florianópolis: CONPEDI, 
2014, with disposal in: 
<http://publicadireito.com.br/publicacao/ufsc/livro.php?gt=194> and access in 
10 january 2015. 
HAMILTON, Alexander. MADISON, James. JAY, John. The Federalist 
Papers: A Collection of Essays Written in Favor of the New Constitution 
MEIRELLES, Hely Lopes. 3ª ed. ref. e atual. Direito Municipal Brasileiro. 
São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1977.  
OBSERVATÓRIO DAS METRÓPOLES. Novas governanças para as áreas 
metropolitanas o panorama internacional e as perspectivas para o caso 
brasileiro. Disposal in: 
http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.ufrj.br/relatorio_Klink.pdf 
POSNER, Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law.  Boston: Little Brown, 
1973. 
SANTOS, Ângela Moulin Penalva. e VASQUES, Pedro. Estatuto da 
Metrópole: avanço normativo na gestão territorial a espera de cooperação 
financeira. In: AIETA, Vânia. (Org.) Direito da Cidade. Tomo I. Coleção 
UERJ 80 Anos. Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos, 2015 
SASSEN, Saskia. The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo: Princeton 
University Press, 1991 
UN-HABITAT. Estado de las Ciudades de America Latina y el Caribe 
2012. http://www.onuhabitat.org 
64
Correia and Sampaio: The Emergence of Metropolitan Areas as a New Form of Interfederat
Published by Reading Room, 2017
